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A recent policy perspective was published in the New
England Journal of Medicine March 5, 2015 by the Sec-
retary of Health And Human Services, Sylvia Burwell, on
setting value-based payment goals for Medicare [1]. These
goals include having at least 30 % of the Medicare pay-
ments provided through such mechanisms as accountable
care organizations (ACOs) and bundled episodes of care by
2016, rising to 50 % by 2018. ACOs are commonly full
risk or risk shared arrangements where the provider is ‘‘on
the hook’’ for the cost of care provided to a set group of
Medicare enrollees. In other words, if at the end of a period
of time (e.g. one year) the cost for care is less than the
‘‘yearly budget’’, then the provider keeps the difference
(e.g. profit). If the cost for care is more than this, the
provider is ‘‘on the hook’’ for the loss. As well, bundled
episodes for care are a derivative of the diagnostic related
group (DRG), which has been in place by Medicare since
1983. DRGs are essentially bundled payments for the
hospital portion of a patient’s stay and are acute in nature.
Under bundled episodes of care, commonly all provider
services (hospital plus physician) are extended past this
period of hospital stay in caring for a patient and can
include: physician care, hospital care, nursing home care
post-hospital discharge, and home care. These same goals
were expressed by a representative from Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) at a recent (April
10, 2015) Samuel Martin Memorial lecture held by the
Leonard Davis Institute (LDI) at the University of
Pennsylvania.
Is it very interesting to note how aggressive CMS has
been in setting and announcing these payment reform
goals. At a recent Academy Health meeting held in early
February 2015 in Washington, DC, payment reform was
discussed by Professors Michael Chernew and Michael
McWilliams from Harvard and Peter Hussey from the
RAND Corp. All three are nationally regarded experts on
payment reform. This panel’s conclusions on how well
these types of payment reform initiatives were progressing
and the resultant cost saving were not encouraging. First, a
bundled payment demonstration that took place from
2010–2013 in California (by the Integrated Health Asso-
ciation and funded by the government) was not successful.
The hospitals that were involved in this demonstration only
enrolled 35 patients over a 3-year period. The issues stated
by those involved in the demonstration were that it was
very complex—it was too much work, there was a lack of
technical infrastructure, and as well a lack of trust between
parties. The conclusion made was that: ‘‘Despite great
initial support, enthusiasm and effort, episode-of-care
payment does not offer an easy fix to the nation’s health-
care financing problems [2]’’. As it related to ACOs, again
the way in which they were configured created issues—
with an unsuccessful end result. The recommendations
made during this session were that patients needed to be
kept in the ACO for the entire year (and cannot be allowed
to float in and out of this arrangement) and that the risk
needed to be two sided (e.g. both Medicare and the pro-
viders being at risk). The take-home messages from their
findings w as follows: better data are required from these
demonstrations, and the payment models will take time
before they are fully baked.
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The above Academy Health presentation by Professor
Chernew was further elucidated upon in a New England
Journal of Medicine analysis of the Pioneer Accountable
Care Organizations [3]. While this analysis demonstrated a
small savings of 1.2 % for the ACOs versus a control group
(Medicare enrollees living in the same hospital referral
regions served by the Pioneer ACO), there were notable
limitations to this analysis. The first limitation related to
the distinct possibility that the likely desire/efforts of the
Pioneer ACOs to constrain spending and to possibly work
extremely hard to accomplish this (e.g. the Hawthorne
effect) and to have the pieces in place ahead of time. The
fact that significant savings were not realized, may speak to
the difficulty in doing so with an ACO model. Secondly,
and as mentioned in the analysis, the costs that CMS has
incurred in attempting to make ACOs work were not
included in the analysis. These additional costs may have
negated the 1.2 % savings realized. Further, back in 2012,
Burns and Pauly commented on the difficulty that ACOs
may have in reducing costs and improving quality—based
on the failures of the integrated network experience of the
1990s [4]. Today, the main issue that remains is care
coordination, which is an integral part of reducing frag-
mented and duplicitous care, and which is a significant cost
driver. It has been noted that patients with chronic condi-
tions refer themselves to many specialists [4] and inte-
grating information technology (IT) on these patients could
provide for more seamless care (there are hundreds of
different systems capturing and reporting on patients—how
do we get IT to ‘‘talk together’’ in such a short period of
time as proposed by Burwell above?). As a matter of fact,
care coordination (with substantial interaction with the
patient) when evaluated recently was found at best to be
cost neutral [5].
CMS recently presented the findings as reported in an
article by McWilliams et al. [3], but in a much different
light [6]. The CMS findings demonstrated close to a
US$400 million savings in Medicare enrollees in the ACO
model versus fee for service over a 2-year period with the
differences in spending being statistically different for each
year. However, the spending difference in year 2 versus
year 1 was much smaller. This may portend difficulties in
the sustainability of spending reductions by ACOs over
time. These difficulties in maintaining sustainable reduc-
tions may also relate to some of the issues identified by
Burns and Pauly [4].
CMS has also reported on the results of bundled pay-
ments with early findings that there were significantly
lower episode payments in orthopedic surgery over a
90-day bundled episode of care (included initial hospital-
ization, all professional services, and all other services
delivered within that 90-day period such as rehabilitation,
follow-up physician visits, etc.) (Note: this was the only
episode of care where there were enough numbers to
report/comment on) [7]. On examining this study in more
detail however, there are a number of issues that should be
mentioned which might be driving these findings. First,
providers whose outcomes were improving without
involvement in the 90-day bundle model may have been
those who signed up for it in the first place—leading one to
a false conclusion that this might work for all [8]. Second,
one-quarter of a calendar year of cost decreases does not
make for sustainable cost decreases. Third, as the Lewin
report states, these episodes of care were in hospitals
located in areas where more affluent populations existed
versus the universe of Medicare-participating hospitals [8].
This may mean that the overall health of these patients
might be better (e.g. needing less care over time and with
better social support systems), and that these institutions
had more resources to engage in care redesign [7]. Not
evaluated in the Lewin report, but likely should be, are the
social determinants of health resulting in better health and
lower costs per capita [9].
So where does that leave us? When the above CMS
representative was asked at the LDI meeting by the author
of this article, if a contingency plan was in place in case
these models do not work, the question was answered in
this manner: ‘‘CMS will continue to tinker with the ACO
and bundled payment models until they are corrected’’. So
how much will this cost and when is the appropriate point
if ACOs or bundled payments do not work for CMS to say
‘‘we need to try something different?’’ Does CMS even
have a fallback position/plan? No mention of one was
made by the CMS representative. One was left with the
impression that it is full steam ahead no matter the
consequences.
For now, the rollout by CMS of these types of payment
models continues unabated in a very aggressive manner (as
per Burwell above) which will likely cost the tax payer
millions of dollars. It appears that CMS is absolutely cer-
tain that these types of payment and delivery models will
ultimately work. The question that has been left unan-
swered is: What if these reforms do not work? When
Professor Michael Chernew was asked this same question
during the Academy Health meeting his response was: ‘‘It
may be back to fee-for-service payment but with a ‘gov-
ernor’ included to limit growth’’. Burns and Pauly sup-
ported this position as espoused by Chernew in a similar
manner—that Medicare is likely to move toward providing
what is effectively a budget-determined capitation payment
(a governor) as an end–of-year adjustment to accumulated
fee-for-service payments [4].
As noted above, health economists at some of the
leading academic teaching institutions (Harvard and
University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School) have
weighed in on these findings with a healthy dose of
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skepticism. It is also fine for the rest of us to examine these
findings in the same way and to question them. It is not fine
however, to accept reports of success and not allow healthy
dialogue on these issues to take place. This dialogue is
important for us to solve the problem of continually rising
health-care costs (viewed as a percent change in health
spending versus GDP). As an industry we need to ask good
questions and continue to challenge executives and policy
makers at institutions such as the CMS—as it controls over
US$600 billion in spending [10].
Stay tuned—Medicare may need a different plan for
controlling spending or this may take longer than Medicare
is envisioning based on its pronouncements and presenta-
tions—resulting in the goals outlined in the New England
Journal of Medicine March 5, 2015 article being pushed
back.
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